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Abstract: Given the recent successes of the “Islamic State,” it is unclear how well the Western-trained Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) will perform against a resilient Taliban. This article recommends expanding the Afghan Local Police (ALP) to improve security, compensate for high Afghan Army attrition, and boost Pashtun
recruitment in Afghanistan’s south and east.

S

ome scholars warn the “Afghanistan surge” from 2010 to 2012
fell well short of the positive, albeit short-term results of the
2007-08 surge in Iraq.1 Since the Taliban threat remains high, its
capabilities lethal, and its ideology resilient, the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF – including both Army and Police) continue to face major
challenges countering insurgency while protecting the civilian population, particularly in the south and east.
Against the backdrop of the “Islamic State’s” initial successes
against the coalition-trained Iraqi Army, there are doubts about the
future effectiveness of the ANSF. The ANSF remains deficient in
intelligence, logistics, and sustainment capabilities, with a shortfall of
non-commissioned officers, a limited air force, and a relative dearth of
Pashtun recruits from the south and east of Afghanistan.2 To meet these
challenges, this article recommends new Afghan leaders adopt a slightly
larger target for the ANSF’s overall size than announced at the NATO
Summit in May 2012 by bolstering the Afghan Local Police to compensate for high Afghan Army attrition and low Pashtun recruitment.
These adjustments would hold the total cost to NATO’s previously
agreed upon $4.1 billion per year by the end of 2017.

Key Challenges

The approach outlined here is designed to address three developmental challenges facing the ANSF. First, the ANSF suffers from roughly
30-percent attrition, 10-percent absenteeism, and inflated recruitment
rolls, all of which impede its operational effectiveness and retention.3
Soldiers and police are often recruited from other areas to serve in urban
outposts and contested localities, providing space for insurgents to

1      The Iraqi “surge” recorded a significant drop in violence until sectarian violence reemerged
in 2013. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Challenges to Afghan Transition (Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, July 31, 2014).
2      Ibid.
3      Ibid. The attrition rate is also analyzed in the US Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2013 (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense,
October 2013),48, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf.
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exploit indigenous populations.4 Secondly, the standing ANSF appears
to be falling into an unsustainability trap, undermining its long-term
viability. The relatively high cost of the ANSF, if not reduced, might
not be underwritten by international donors beyond another five years.5
Thirdly, the top-down, corrupt practices of the national government
could continue under the new “national unity” government, eroding
its legitimacy and the ANSF’s will to fight. If new Afghan leaders fail
to show flexibility in incorporating their country’s ethnically and tribally diverse populace into a national security architecture, Afghanistan
may devolve over time into a political mosaic of different armed groups
controlling separatist-like territories.
For these reasons, the United States and other coalition members
should encourage new Afghan leaders to stand up a more resilient, inclusive, and localized security structure to deter and respond to terrorist
and other criminal attacks, while keeping conventional forces focused
on countering larger insurgent concentrations. Like politics, all security
is local. Drawing on the personal commitments of Afghan Local Police
(ALP) recruits to protect their families, community, and tribal ties, the
ALP can improve security in both rural and urban areas.
The approach described here calls for improving the accountability
of expanded ALP forces. Local communities must believe police forces
can be held accountable, and new Afghan leaders must be convinced
ALP forces will not support local or regional strong-men.6 To address
these issues, Afghan leaders should consider tapping Afghan National
Army Special Operation Forces to assume the key tasks of recruiting,
supplying, and mentoring ALP forces, while other authorities establish
an overlapping monitoring system.
In addition, the ALP approach urges special forces officers to
engage with local partners in recruiting and monitoring ALP forces.
The inclusion of these partners should make the national government
more accountable to the extent that it recognizes the need for stronger
grassroots support throughout the country. During this process, international donors should anticipate that Afghan progress towards more
inclusive democracy will be as slow, fitful, and inconsistent as it was in
their own countries.
Part one below reviews three main ANSF-sizing positions, part
two lays out a mid-sizing option relying on ALP development, and part
4      This was the case in most of Afghanistan and Iraq except for the latter’s Sunni triangle and
Kurdish region. Thomas E. Ricks, Ricks, The Gamble: David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure
in Iraq 2006-08 (London: Penguin, 2009), 219-20. Ricks argues the US-led Coalition began working more effectively with Iraq’s tribal and ethnic structure in those areas during 2007, under the
leadership of Petraeus and then Brigadier General John Allen. Other observers argue the Sunni
Awakening was embraced earlier. Notwithstanding chronology, General Petraeus made similar efforts to draw ethnic forces into the overall Iraqi defense effort in Mosul in 2004. In all cases, sustainability of these forces – both financial and political – became a glaring problem over time since they
were mainly seen as potential challenges to the government rather than localized approaches to be
incorporated into the government.
5      Because of funding uncertainty, many critics believe a universal draft is the long-term answer
to bringing down the cost of the ANSF. Compulsory service was proposed by President Karzai
in early 2010 but most scholars have ruled it out mainly because of its potential to alienate local
populaces in the very areas where the insurgency is strongest. Jerry Meyerle, et al., Conscription in the
Afghan Army (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, April 2011).
6     Department for International Development, Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform
(London: Department for International Development, 2002), 27-33.
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three assesses two major objections to this option, hinging on ALP
accountability.

I. ANSF-SIZING

The US-led NATO coalition in Afghanistan has long regarded the
ANSF as necessary to the war-torn country’s long-term peace and stability. The ANSF is perhaps the most studied aspect of Afghan government
power, the largest Afghan investment made by the US government, and
the linchpin of the coalition’s exit strategy. What is shaping current
thinking on the ANSF’s size and structure?

The Zero Option: Setting the Stage for the ANSF after 2014

Afghanistan’s international donors have increasingly focused on
ANSF planning since President Barack Obama unveiled the US “zero
option” decision in May 2014. In light of the ANSF’s takeover of
the lead security role throughout Afghanistan in June 2013, President
Obama decided to draw down US advisors, trainers, and counter-terrorism forces by 2017.7 This Presidential decision reflects a prior US (and
NATO) political commitment to transition out of Afghanistan while
expressing confidence in Afghan-led security efforts after thirteen years
of overall support encompassing about $750 billion in US assistance and
the lives of almost 3,500 coalition soldiers.8

Three Views on Future ANSF Sizing
Position 1: Reduce ANSF Size to a Financially Sustainable Level by the End of
2017

This first view is defined by official coalition policy announced at
the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012. The Summit called for
reducing the ANSF force from the currently planned level of 382,000 to
258,500 by the end of 2017.9 The main reason for this decision appears
to be long-term financial sustainability: coalition nations decided the
ANSF budget should be reduced from the current $11 billion to $4.1
billion per year by the end of 2017. The United States would contribute
$2.3 billion, the remaining coalition nations $1.3 billion, and the Afghan
government $500 million per year through 2024.10 The Summit communique emphasized that ANSF size would be regularly assessed in
light of the evolving security environment, stating:
The pace and the size of a gradual managed force reduction from the ANSF
surge peak to a sustainable level will be conditions-based and decided by
7      “Statement by the President on Afghanistan,” White House, May 27, 2014.
8      Anthony H. Cordesman, “The U.S. Cost of the Afghan War: FY2002-2013,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, May 15, 2013, https://csis.org/publication/us-cost-afghan-war-fy2002fy2013; and “The Cost of War in Afghanistan since 2001,” National Priorities Project, http://nationalpriorities.org/cost-of/.
9      “Fact Sheet: Chicago Summit – Sufficient and Sustainable ANSF,” White House, May 21,
2012. A major recruitment effort has doubled the size of the ANSF since 2009. At the end
of 2013, ANSF personnel totaled 334,852 (about 185,000 Afghan National Army and 150,000
Afghan National Police), as reported by NATO, Combined Security Transition Command to the U.S.
Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction in January 2014. Special Inspector General for
Aghanistan Reconsturction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 3014 (Arlington,
VA: Special Inspector General for Aghanistan Reconsturction, January 30 2014), http://www.sigar.
mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014Jan30QR.pdf.
10      Ibid.
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the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in consultation
with the International Community. The preliminary model for a future total
ANSF size, defined by the International Community and the Government
of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, will be reviewed regularly against the
developing security environment.11

To date, NATO’s preliminary ANSF target for the end of 2017 has not
been formally revised.
The smaller ANSF size proposed at the NATO summit was based
on the need to set politically acceptable levels of international financial
support to 2024. Since 2012, the ANSF has performed well, holding its
own against the Taliban while suffering substantial casualties.12 Yet, the
ANSF still relies heavily on NATO financial and military aid in roles
such as air support, logistics, and reconnaissance. Charting a near-term
path to make the ANSF more self-sufficient is a key objective of the
NATO community.

Position 2: Maintain Current ANSF Size through 2018

The chief representative of this view is the Center for Naval Analyses
(CNA) selected by the Department of Defense to make “an independent
assessment of the strength, force structure, force posture, and capabilities required to make the ANSF capable of providing security.”13 Its
January 2014 report argues Afghanistan’s security efforts through 2018
will require a slight decrease in the current ANSF force structure from
the currently planned level of 382,000 to 373,400 personnel.14 It estimates the annual cost of sustaining these force numbers would be about
$5-6 billion per year at a time of budget constraints for Afghanistan’s
international donors, including the United States.
This estimate is predicated on assuming the Taliban insurgency will
grow beyond 2014. Between 2015 and 2016, the Taliban is likely to keep
pressure on the ANSF in rural areas, expand its control and influence in
areas vacated by coalition forces, encircle key cities, conduct high-profile
attacks in Kabul and other urban areas, and gain leverage for future
political negotiations. Between 2016 and 2018, once the insurgency has
had time to recover from the past decade and a half of fighting, the
expectation is of a much larger and more intense Taliban insurgency
effort.15
Moreover, the report assumes if NATO significantly cuts its commitment to Afghanistan and Pakistan, tensions between the two nations
are likely to worsen. The CNA also believes a rapid decline in international financial support could lead to another civil war in Afghanistan,
thus implying NATO’s policy decision of May 2012 was not only risky,
but premature since the Taliban insurgency, a potential civil war, and
11      NATO, “Official Text: Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan,” May 21, 2012, http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm.
12      This assessment is widely shared. William A. Byrd, Revisiting Chicago: The Critical Need to
Maintain Support for Afghanistan’s National Security Forces Post-2014 (Washington: US Institute of Peace,
June 5, 2014).
13      CNA, “Summary of Independent Assessment of Afghan National Security Forces, ” January
2014, https://www.cna.org/research/2014/summary-independent-assessment-afghan-national.
14      Jonathan Schroden, et al., Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces (Alexandria,
VA: Center for Naval Analyses, January 2014). CNA’s assessment calls for about 10,000 more ANA
personnel than does the current planning target, while reducing the ANP by about 5,000.
15      Ibid.
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worsening Afghan-Pakistani relations loom as existential threats to the
Afghan government. It also contends large-scale spending is required
until these threats have been significantly diminished. In short, this
view relies on a worst-case scenario to justify a large ANSF size through
2018, and presumably beyond.16
The financial cost of the ANSF is of particular concern moving
forward. If the Afghan government proceeds with an ANSF-sizing
trajectory in line with CNA’s assessment, international donations will
remain vital. As history has shown, however, international donations
decline over time in concert with troop withdrawals. If the Afghan
force-structure is not revised before this aid pipeline dries up, the Afghan
government may be forced to cut back security efforts in rural areas. In
such a scenario, a large standing Afghan National Army (ANA) may
well be preserved, while dispersed Afghan National Police (ANP) and
Afghan Local Police forces are cut. This outcome is likely to present the
Taliban and other criminal groups with opportunities to challenge the
Afghan national government.

Position 3: A Smaller Military Footprint

One of the prominent advocates of this group is Scott Mann, a retired
US Army special operations force officer, who helped design the Village
Stability Program and stood up the first Village Stability Coordination
Center in southern Afghanistan.17 Mann argues the ANSF continues to
face a serious insurgency whose center of gravity lies in rural community
support. The relative lack of ANSF presence in rural areas cedes recruitment and training grounds to Muslim extremists.18
This view argues for partnering ANSF SOF forces with Afghan
Local Police (ALP) units (including irregular local militia) in remote
areas to ensure that training and equipment are adequate, local defense
capabilities are effective, and the villagers themselves have confidence
and buy-in to resist Taliban insurgents. This position identifies Special
Operations Forces for this train-and-assist task because of past US
history working with Afghan defense groups, going back to the retaking of Afghanistan from the Taliban in late 2001. In addition, Mann
believes local ALP unit commanders should be made accountable to
their village elders and tribal leaders, as well as national government (or
ANSF) leadership.19
Mann points out the ALP has significant potential to stand up
as Pashtun tribal defense forces (arbakai) if its members “are truly
local, treat the people well, and if the community to which they are

16      Ibid.
17     This position reportedly includes senior-level US administration officials such as Vice President
Joseph Biden. Fred Kaplan, “Obama’s new policy for Afghanistan tries to steer a middle course,”
Slate, March 27, 2009, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2009/03/co
unterinsurgenterrorism.1.html. Also Fred Kaplan, “CT or COIN?,” Slate, March 24, 2009, http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2009/03/ct_or_coin.html.
18      Scott Mann, “Bypassing the Graveyard: A New Approach to Stabilizing Afghanistan,”
Small Wars Journal, July 30, 2014, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/bypassing-the-graveyard
-a-new-approach-to-stabilizing-afghanistan.
19      Ibid.
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accountable accepts them as part of their social structure.”20 Afghan
Deputy Minister Tariq Ismati of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation
and Development points out, “If the arbakai are put in situations where
they are not trusted by the whole population, they will be seen as militias
rather than arbakai.”21
While attuned to Pashtun cultural issues, this view has not proposed a specific number of ANSF Special Operations (SO) commando
battalions or ALP forces needed to secure Afghanistan, especially its
restive south and east where most of the country’s poor, illiterate, and
religiously conservative Pashtuns reside. Nor has it addressed training
issues surrounding the merging of the ALP into the ANSF command
structure.

II. A NEW SIZING OPTION AT NATO-AGREED COST
Reduce the ANA and Raise the ALP through 2017

This article proposes a new sizing option based on blending key
elements of the three options reviewed above. This option embraces a
slightly larger target for the ANSF’s overall size compared to the NATO
Summit target while incorporating ALP elements, and adjusting internal
ANSF component numbers to hold the total cost to NATO’s previously
agreed upon $4.1 billion per year by the end of 2017.
The table below compares the key ANSF numbers proposed in
the current Plan of Record, CNA report, NATO Summit, and this
article; it breaks down the ANSF’s total size in terms of its major force
components:47,300 175,500 34,300 228,500 (22,000)
22

23

24

25

26

AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

PLAN
CNA
NATO
NEW

ANA
165,500
175,50023
95,000

(SOF)
(11,900)
(11,900)
228,50025
(22,000)26

ANP
139,200
134,500
125,000

ALP
30,000
29,100
30,000
60,000

OTHER
47,30022
34,30024

TOTAL
382,000
373,400
258,500
280,000

PLAN = Current ANSF Plan of Record quoted in the CNA study, CNA = Center for Naval
Analyses, NATO = Summit Decision of May 2012, NEW = This article, ANA = Afghan
National Army, SOF = Afghan Army Special Operations Forces, ANP = Afghan National
Police, ALP = Afghan Local Police

20      Ibid. Also see Mohammed Osman Tariq, Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan,
Occasional Paper No. 7 (London: Crisis States Research Center, December 2008), http://www.lse.
ac.uk/internationaldevelopment/research/crisisstates/download/op/op7tariq.pdf.
21     
Interview with Deputy Minister Tariq Ismati, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development, October 2012. Savannah, Georgia. (Quoted by Scott Mann in Ibid.)
22      Other includes recruits, training staff, and Defense and Interior Ministry staff.
23      The CNA number adds 18,900 logistics and support positions and 2,500 Army Headquarters
staff, while eliminating 9,800 infantry and 1,500 combat support soldiers. These ANA changes plus
the elimination of funding for 14,600 Afghan Civil Order Police and 12,400 Defense and Interior
Ministry staff mainly account for the CNA’s slightly smaller ANSF size compared to the Plan of
Record size.
24      The CNA retains all of the PLAN’s “other” categories except 12,400 Defense and Interior
ministry staffers, presuming coverage by the Afghan government budget.
25      NATO has not publicly released a more detailed break-down of its ANSF target size announced at the May 2012 Summit.
26      Included in the ANA number.
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As the table shows, the approach doubles the size of the ANA/SOF and
Afghan Local Police by the end of 2017 to help absorb the relatively high
attrition of Afghan Army soldiers. The SOF and ALP personnel hikes
as well as improved salaries, can be covered by reducing full-time ANA
personnel. This proposal is designed to support a strong, consistent
narrative on the financial sustainability of the ANSF. The financial
sustainability of the counter-insurgency force is as much a part of effective strategy as the use and reliability of the force itself.

The Right Ratio?

Current estimates put the total number of Taliban fighters around
25,000.27 If this is true, the sizing proposal presented here means one
insurgent faces three ANA or six other ANSF personnel. This ratio
glosses over a number of important questions including the right toothto-tail ratio for the ANA (historical US military averages would put 15
percent of the ANA force in headquarters and 35 percent in logistics),
the complementary counter-terrorism roles of the ANA and ANP/ALP,
and the degree to which the new ANSF can respond rapidly to a wide
spectrum of enemy actions.
Nonetheless, this ratio has proven to be sufficient to counter
Taliban strikes so far, mostly consisting of improvised explosive devices
(IEDs), suicide bombers, hit-and-run raids, insider attacks, and remote
ambushes. To the extent Taliban forces consolidate for conventional
operations, ANA Special Operation Forces and ANP Civil Order Police
(totaling 26,500 and geared to rapid response) should be sufficient to
take point and give advantage to ANA infantry battalions with their
superior weaponry and tactics.

Why Reduce the ANA?

The force structure outlined here returns the ANA to mid-2009
levels, while augmenting and improving the ANA SOF, ANP and ALP
to serve as the front-line against terrorist attacks by the Taliban and
related groups. This sizing proposal is designed to address long-standing
strategic challenges including the need for effective counter-terrorism
efforts, reduced civilian casualties, a lower ANSF attrition rate, and a
solid path toward Afghan self-sustainability. Failure to make progress
on these strategic challenges by 2017 may well set up Afghanistan for
failure, more so than potential security threats posed by the Taliban and
other groups.

Growing Casualties

The ANA’s smaller footprint (but larger SOF element) is critical to
reduce civilian casualties while countering Taliban terrorist tactics in the
future. At present, civilian casualties in Afghanistan are on a significant
upswing, particularly in and around Kabul, and in seven provinces in east
and south Afghanistan. ANSF positions have sustained small, largely
harassing terrorist attacks that nevertheless take a heavy toll in civilian

27     Rod Nordland, “Study Finds Sharp Rise in Attacks by Taliban,” New York Times, April 19,
2013.
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casualties.28 A recent United Nation report indicates civilian deaths and
injuries rose 24 percent in the first half of 2014 compared to the same
period in 2013.29 This sharp spike in casualties mostly stemmed from
escalating ground engagements between Taliban-associated groups and
the ANA. Indeed, civilian deaths from mortars, rockets, and grenades
more than doubled from the same six-month period in 2013.
It is counter-intuitive to argue fewer Afghan army soldiers on the
ground will translate into greater public security. In practice, however,
the ANA SOF is more capable of taking the lead in conducting counterterrorist operations and raids against Taliban leadership and other
high-value targets while restraining civilian casualties. Conventional
ANA forces should be dedicated largely to what they are trained to do
best: respond to conventional direct and complex Taliban offensives
once the insurgents act against population centers and other targets.
Over time, shrinking the number of ANA bases may also funnel Taliban
terrorist attacks to them, further limiting prospects for collateral
damage. Reducing civilian casualties, if realized, will help establish a
virtuous cycle in which the ANSF receives stronger public support for
its security efforts.

High Attrition

The Afghan National Army currently suffers from a high attrition
rate.30 Recent statistics indicate almost a third of its trained personnel
move on after their first year of service.31 More must be done to retain
the expertise of these departing soldiers; hence the need for an expanded
ALP, as well as ANA, pay incentives. Assuming the current attrition rate
remains constant, the ANA size will shrink to a target of 95,000 by 2017.
While some observers believe most of these departing soldiers return
to peaceful lives in their home provinces, it is reasonable to expect that
some join other armed groups including the Taliban, local warlords, and
drug-trafficking chiefs. If true, it suggests the ANA could actually be
training and, to some extent, equipping internal Afghan power brokers.
Down-sizing the ANA (and encouraging retention through pay incentives) will reduce future attrition flows to the ANSF’s adversaries, even
if the attrition rate itself does not fall.

Civil Strife & Border Security Challenges

Some analysts believe a larger ANA is needed to counter additional
threats including regional war-lords operating on ethnic or tribal lines, a
Taliban surge swelled by terrorists flooding in from northwest Pakistan,
and possibly even Pakistani army units that challenge Afghan border

28      Anti-government elements including the Taliban accounted for 74 percent of the civilian
casualties in the first half of 2014, while the ANSF caused 8 percent, according to: United Nations
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Afghanistan: Midyear Report 2014, Protection of Civilians in Armed
Confllict (Kabul, Afghanistan: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, July 2014).
29      Ibid.
30      The ANA also suffers from high absenteeism, apparently stemming from cultural work ethics, inadequate supervision and the lack of cross-checking attendance-taking systems.
31      The attrition rate was 31.4 percent per year as of September 2013, according to US
Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2013
,48. ANP attrition is also significant but recruitment has compensated for these losses for the most
recently reported period from September 2012 to September 2013, according to US Department
of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013 (Washington,
DC: US Department of Defense, November 2013).
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control.32 Most of these potential threats are likely to emerge in eastern
Afghanistan (the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar, Khost, Pakhtia,
and Paktika), and in the south (Helmand and Kandahar). At present,
these provinces receive the brunt of attacks by Taliban groups (including the Haqqani Network), and conflict zones are situated along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border, strategic transit routes, and river valleys.
Conventional ANA units can be efficiently cross-loaded to these regions
while operating with a reduced standing force. Of course, the NATO
coalition will need to improve the ANA’s rapid-response time by providing additional air support assistance.
The current ANSF Plan of Record – similar to the CNA assessment
–calls for only 7,800 air force staff out of a total of 382,000 positions.33
Air capability must be significantly strengthened to protect remote ANP
posts adequately over time. Each functional aircraft acts as a forcemultiplier in support of the proposed decentralized, local security force
structure. It is therefore critically necessary for the coalition to regularly
review its support to the Afghan National Air Force, as it has done for
the Iraqi Army.

Why a Larger ALP?

Adopting a localized approach to absorbing naturally retiring ANA
soldiers calls for doubling the current ALP size from 30,000 to 60,000 by
the end of 2017. The ALP component is defined as an ANP reserve that
serves under ANA SOF mentors and senior ANP officers. Such a force
would act to soak up retired ANA soldiers who wish to return to their
homes and continue to serve their communities. Just as importantly,
this component would constitute the main channel through which to
recruit security officers for under-served regions, notably the south and
east of Afghanistan.34 This recruitment effort should be led by ANA
SOF mentors and would require input from tribal, village, district, and
national government representatives.
The extent to which these recruits can be located around ANP posts
in population centers to monitor terrorist activities, the more secure
such posts should be. On the other hand, establishing these units in
remote rural areas is equally essential to fill a security vacuum, although
such posts will remain difficult to staff and defend.
While committed to deterring crime, the ANP and ALP will
continue to be first responders to Taliban terrorist attacks in concert
with ANA SOF forces. The Afghan Uniformed and Anti-Crime Police
(AUP), numbering about 98,000 of the 150,000-strong ANP, constitutes
the main crime-fighting force of the ANP.35 Since AUP and ALP units
confront both criminal and terrorist organizations, they must continue,
in concert with the ANA SOF and ANP’s Counter Terrorism Police, to
32      This threat array was derived from the CNA. Jonathan Schroden, et al., Summary of Independent
Assessment of Afghan National Security Forces (Alexandria, VA: CNA, January 2014).
33      Cordesman, The Challenges to Afghan Transition.
34      The ALP approach drawing on arbakai appears better suited for this region where tribal
traditions persist. Mohammed Osman Tariq, Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan.
35      The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniform Police, responsible for general police duties, and
four specialized police organizations: the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan
Border Police, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and the Afghan Anti-Crime
Police, including a counter- narcotics, a counter- terrorism, and a criminal investigations department.
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be trained to handle both threats. By contrast, the ANA is dedicated to
holding bases around urban areas and roads (so-called tier one and two
areas mainly in the south and east of Afghanistan) where the majority
of rocket launches, complex attacks, and hit-and-run raids occur. These
ANA formations would continue to respond to major attacks on ANP
and ALP forces.

III. TWO MAJOR OBJECTIONS

This restructuring proposal is controversial. Two key objections
to this approach stem from the widespread Afghan perception that the
ALP is inherently unaccountable, falling under regional power brokers
working at variance with national leaders. In fact, Afghan villagers “do
not distinguish between the local police, who are formally part of the
government, and private militias…(serving) for years as a proxy for
weak government forces.”36 As a result, the “accountability” issue must
be carefully addressed to undergird any ALP expansion.

Objection One: ALP Units Would Challenge National Sovereignty

There is an inherent knee-jerk reaction among critics to label local
security forces as independent militias that could threaten the integrity
of the Afghan state. In fact, locally originated village defense groups
have been consistently rejected by Afghan national leaders over the past
decade – and by NATO Coalition officials who generally regard them as
a potential challenge to civilian control of the military and to the state’s
monopoly on the use of force.37

Case Study in Nangarhar

A case in point is the coalition’s experience in Nangarhar province
in eastern Afghanistan in 2009. One hundred and sixty of the most
influential Shinwari tribal elders agreed among themselves to denounce
the Taliban in public. They sought help from the coalition and the
Afghan government to remove corrupt local officials and to have a say in
who served in the local security forces in their tribal area. Both requests
are still valid: corrupt leaders remain a major source of instability, and
the ANP needs tribal support to be successful.38
Insurgents eventually lost their freedom of movement in Shinwari
areas of Nangarhar, whereas the ANP could operate freely. The socalled Shinwari pact – an agreement among the Shinwari themselves and
not with the NATO coalition – provided badly needed mutual support
for their dispersed villages, as required in a counterinsurgency campaign. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hailed the pact as an example
of “classic counterinsurgency.”39 Additionally, the coalition’s military
leadership in Afghanistan viewed the pact as an opportunity to improve
subnational governance by drawing in traditional tribal structures.
36      Azam Ahmed, “Taliban are Rising Again in Afghanistan’s North,” New York Times, October
23, 2014.
37      Ibid. Ahmed reports that newly elected President Ashraf Ghani has “promised to disarm
(local) militias,” chiefly because they collect taxes by force to support themselves.
38      Randy George and Dante Paradiso, “The Case for a Wartime Chief Executive Officer: Fixing
the Interagency Quagmire in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, June 21, 2011.
39      Ibid.
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The US embassy, however, opposed the pact after Afghan senior
officials complained it undermined the Karzai administration.40
Subsequently, conflicting civilian and military guidance led to confusion
among both Afghan and Coalition officials. The US embassy in Kabul
forbade US diplomats from meeting with tribal leaders to discuss tribal
“pacts,” ruling out on-the-ground contact with local defense groups
concerning counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.41 The opportunity was lost, chiefly out of concern local defense groups might spur
inter-tribal conflict and eventually oppose the national government.

Overarching Control

This case underscores the importance of bringing local defense
initiatives under overarching ANA/ANP control. First, ALP and ANP
reservists should be equipped with a limited load-out of ammunition and
weapons (AK-47s and RPGs, and perhaps 1-2 machine guns). This step
would prevent these forces from amassing weapons and ammunition to
expand their numbers or challenge higher authorities. A close partnership with the ANA SOF is key to preventing these local security forces
from being overrun by insurgents or lapsing into exploitative practices.
Second, active ANA SOF forces should take charge of ALP training
in public and post protection. An active platoon could rotate through
various villages in its area of operations and equip, train, and mentor
the reservists. This measure would give the ANA an opportunity to
recuperate from front-line operations and facilitates local-national
cooperation. The key caveat is the ANA must ensure supplies and training are delivered to local forces. Any disruption in this flow would
damage intra-ALP morale and fuel chronic fears in rural areas that the
national government does not care about improving ALP accountability
or public security.

Objection Two: ANP and ALP are Corrupt, and Inadequately Trained and
Supervised

A Corrupt ANP

The ANP and ALP are not positively viewed by Afghans: they are
widely seen as corrupt, incompetent, and closely tied to local power
brokers.42 Why suggest they have any utility as front-line responders?
Admittedly, the training of Afghan police officers has been inadequate,
complicated by limited training budgets and the need for the ANP/
ALP to conduct both counter-terrorism and crime-fighting roles.43 Just
as importantly, ANP/ALP corruption appears to be much higher in the
south and east of Afghanistan where the Taliban is centered. The ANP
is susceptible to bribery by Taliban and other criminal groups operating lucrative drug-trafficking operations.44 These corruption issues
40     B. Matta, “TribalDispute in Afghanistan Benefits Taliban,” Voice of American News, October
10, 2011.
41      Ibid.
42      Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for
Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 3, 2009), 41-42.
43      Donald J. Planty and Robert M. Perito, Police Transition in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: US
Institute of Peace, February 5, 2013).
44      See a fuller discussion in Cordesman, The Challenges to Afghan Transition.
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constitute serious threats to the legitimacy of Afghanistan’s national
government and call into question any proposal that would identify the
ANP as part of the solution to Afghanistan’s current instability.45

Overlapping Chains of Reporting

Faced with these obstacles, the ANP and ALP have done much more
effective work in areas where they have had coalition and ANA Special
Forces partners – even though they remain susceptible to local feuds,
power brokers, and their own exploitation of the local population.46
Since Afghanistan’s regional and ethnic divisions have the potential to
shift ANP and ALP forces into dominant factions, the proposal outlined
here recommends a highly redundant, overlapping system of chains of
reporting for both forces. This means ANP and ALP units should
be visited frequently by those authorities to whom they report: ANA
Special Operations officers, senior ANP officers, village headmen, and
district chiefs. These cross-checking visits and overlapping authorities
may be confusing to ANP/ALP officers to the extent they receive conflicting guidance. As a result, the chain of command must be clear but
dual-use, drawing on SOF officers for counter-terrorism actions and
ANP officers for criminal interdiction. On the other hand, the reporting system is diffuse, thereby better informing senior authorities how
well ANP and ALP units perform. Such monitoring reports should,
in turn, make ALP actions more transparent and effective over time.
Just as crucially, if an ANSF general officer or political leader attempts
to suborn ALP units, the over-lapping system of reporting authorities
should expose the problem and lead to resolution.
Assessment visits tapping into multiple sources and local opinion
should make clear to the ANP and ALP their pay is tied to their progress
in guaranteeing public security. Assessing police units will permit better
funding for those who perform their missions and more training and
other corrective actions for those that do not. It is counter-productive
to provide additional training for ANP and ALP units without first
identifying their shortcomings and making them accountable through
multiple-channel assessments.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the legitimacy of the Afghan national government may
determine if the ANSF fights, or falls to the Taliban. Many observers
believe international donors saddled Afghanistan with a governmental
system in 2001-2003 that was too centralized.47 Structuring the Afghan
state under an extremely powerful chief executive appears to have
retarded the development of checks-and-balances and facilitated corrupt

45      One of President Karzai’s brothers, Ahmed Wali Karzai, was identified as such a criminal
actor, according to press reports. Simon Tisdall, “Ahmed Wali Karzai, the Corrupt and Lawless
Face of Modern Afghanistan,” Guardian, July 12, 2011. A.W. Karzai was killed by his bodyguard
on July 9, 2011.
46      Cordesman, The Challenges to Afghan Transition.
47      Aunohita Mojumdar, “Afghanistan: Rethinking the Constitutional Balance of Power,”
Eurasianet, October 1, 2009, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav100209a.
shtml. Power in Afghanistan is highly concentrated in the President’s office. Governors of provinces are appointed by the president. Provincial councils – whose elections are held concurrently
with the presidential vote -- have no powers and barely any role in the management of local affairs.
District council elections have yet to be held.
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practices. Moving away from this top-down system has the potential
to foster positive democratic trends including the election of local-level
representative bodies and a more responsive justice system.
Whether or not these democratic reforms can be instituted over
the long term, the time is right for the new Afghan leadership to try
to boost ANSF forces in areas heavily influenced and contested by the
Taliban. Indeed, the Taliban has already adopted its own version of
the ALP approach outlined here and continue to forge it into a conventional force. Faced with this adversary (and the relative success of
this approach), Afghan leaders should reach out to tribal elders to help
protect their home lands. If asked, tribal elders will likely show courage
but need to be backed up by an inclusive ANSF.48
The alternative to this course appears stark: Afghanistan may again
have to resort to its allies to stave off existential challenges to its government. Drawing red lines that trigger the return of international security
forces, as in the past, will largely be determined by the national security
interests of Afghanistan’s allies. On the other hand, a more effective,
inclusive, and accountable ANSF depends on the decisions of Afghans
alone.

48      Following a six-day battle between the ANSF and Taliban killing over 100 civilians in the
Ghazni district of Ajrestan in September 2014, Pashtun villagers hanged four Taliban fighters turned
over by the ANSF. Their action demonstrated a strong resolve to resist the Taliban and protect
their homeland. Reuters, “Afghan Villagers Hang Taliban Fighters as Battle for District Rages,”
September 27, 2014.

